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international in nature, piracy, if left unchecked, will eventually provide the catalyst for future international crises and
conflicts. This is a worthwhile read for
anyone who is interested in or responsible for maritime security.
JAMES F. MURRAY

Captain, U.S. Coast Guard
Naval War College

Menon, Raja. A Nuclear Strategy for India. New
Delhi: Sage, 2000. 316pp. $45

Indian officers have written remarkably
little about nuclear strategy in the more
than quarter-century since India first
demonstrated its ability to produce nuclear weapons. The cloak of secrecy that
has traditionally surrounded India’s nuclear program, New Delhi’s declared policy of maintaining a nonweaponized
nuclear stockpile, and a lack of interest in
nuclear issues on the part of the Indian
officer corps stifled discussion of nuclear
issues. It is notable that the two most
comprehensive accounts of India’s nuclear
and missile programs written to date—
George Perkovich’s India’s Nuclear Bomb
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press,
1999) and Raj Chengappa’s Weapons of
Peace (New Delhi: HarperCollins India,
2000)—were written by an American
scholar and an Indian journalist, respectively. India and Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear
weapon tests changed all that, bringing
New Delhi’s nuclear program into the
open and triggering a new wave of thinking and writing about nuclear strategy.
Raja Menon’s A Nuclear Strategy for India represents one of the first serious attempts by an Indian officer to address the
doctrinal and force posture issues arising
from India’s decision to go nuclear. The
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author, a naval officer who retired in
1994 as Assistant Chief of the Indian Naval Staff for Operations, is well qualified
to write on this subject.
Menon begins by reviewing the history of
New Delhi’s nuclear program and the development, such as it is, of Indian nuclear strategy. He is sharply critical of the
Indian government and armed forces’
traditional approach toward nuclear
weapons. He argues that decisions on
nuclear weapons have been fueled by a
mixture of political rhetoric and organizational politics but have occurred in a
strategic vacuum. The secrecy that has
always surrounded the Indian nuclear
weapon program has prevented a dialogue between the political leadership,
the military, and defense scientists on
strategy and force posture issues. He argues that rational analysis, not emotion,
should guide Indian nuclear policy.
The remainder of the book offers just
such an analysis. Menon begins by giving
the reader a primer on nuclear strategy,
one that borrows heavily from U.S. literature on nuclear deterrence of the 1970s
and 1980s. One wonders just how applicable this literature was to the problems
the United States faced during the Cold
War, let alone those India may face in the
twenty-first century. Clearly, Indian
thinking about nuclear weapons is still in
its infancy.
Menon’s prescriptions for India make up
the most interesting part of the book.
While commentators in the United States
have tended to focus on the IndoPakistani nuclear rivalry, the author
makes it clear that it is China’s nuclear
and missile programs that drive New
Delhi’s force posture. He is particularly
concerned that a modernized Chinese
nuclear arsenal carried atop highly accurate missiles will render fixed targets in
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India increasingly vulnerable. He therefore argues for a nuclear force that relies
upon mobility to ensure its survivability.
The final section of Menon’s book is a
thorough discussion of the nuclear options open to India. He recommends that
India adopt a rail-garrison, land-based
missile force until it can shift to reliance
upon ballistic missile–carrying submarines by 2020 (a date that seems extremely optimistic, given the troubled
history of India’s indigenous submarine
programs). He also argues that India
should field cruise missiles for both conventional and nuclear missions.
Menon is skeptical of the contention that
nuclear weapons themselves offer an effective deterrent. He argues that a state’s
force posture and command and control
arrangements are also important. Menon
calls for extensive changes in Indian military decision making, suggesting arrangements that draw heavily upon those of
the United States. He believes, for example, that India needs to adopt its own
version of the national command authority and Joint Chiefs of Staff to command
and control its nuclear forces. He also argues that India needs to codify its targeting policy in its own version of the Single
Integrated Operational Plan.
A Nuclear Strategy for India is likely only
the first of many efforts to think through
the implications of India’s decision to go
nuclear. While but a first step, it provides
the groundwork upon which others will
doubtless build.
THOMAS G. MAHNKEN

Naval War College
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Wickham, John A. Korea on the Brink: From the
“12/12 Incident” to the Kwangju Uprising, 1979–1980.
Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press,
1999. 240pp. $20

For some reason, Korea is a major blind
spot in U.S. thinking about world affairs.
Public commemoration of the Korean
War’s fiftieth anniversary is almost nonexistent compared to the attention paid
to the Second World War in the first half
of the 1990s. Today, the Cold War lingers
on in East Asia with the continuing division of the peninsula, which remains one
of the locations in which the United
States is most likely to go to war in the
immediate future. Yet the American interaction with Korea is in many ways a
success story in U.S. foreign policy, at
least in the southern half of the country.
The Republic of Korea has become an industrial, market-driven economy with a
civilian-led democratic government that
enjoys grassroots support among its citizenry. The road to this state, however,
was fraught with extreme danger. From
the mid-1960s until the early 1980s, there
was a nearly continuous real possibility
of war on the peninsula again. One of the
periods of maximum danger was between
1979 and 1981, in the wake of the assassination of President Park Chung-hee and
a military coup that toppled the civilian
successor government.
General John A. Wickham was the commander of U.S. forces in Korea during
this period, and this book is a memoir of
his efforts to keep the United States and
South Korea focused on their combat
missions despite the turmoil of the time.
Even though Wickham was a military
commander, he could not turn a blind
eye to politics. The South Korean army
had become thoroughly politicized after
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